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LOS ANGELES AS A
SINGLE-CELLED ORGANISM
Robert S. Chang*
Rampart has many people pointing fingers. Some say that the
problem stems from a few rogue cops. Others say that the problem
can be located in the culture of the Los Angeles Police Department
(LAPD). Still others blame prosecutors, judges, defense attorneys,
and so on. Fingers pointing everywhere.
There is plenty of localized blame to go around, but I would like
to expand the temporal and geographic frame to look at broader gov-
ernmental and societal practices, the "master narrative,"' that led us
here. The master narrative seems to include a set of rules similar to
three basic rules for survival that guide a single-celled organism:
(1) keep out that which is undesirable;
(2) isolate and control that which cannot be kept out; and
(3) expel, whenever possible, undesirable elements.
*Professor of Law, Loyola Law School; A.B., Princeton University;
J.D., M.A., Duke University. © 2000 Robert S. Chang. A version of this Es-
say was presented on September 15, 2000, at Looking Beyond Rampart: Les-
sons for Los Angeles, a Symposium sponsored by Loyola Law School and the
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review. I would like to thank my colleague Cath-
erine Fisk for inviting me to participate, and the editors of the law review for
their careful attention to this Essay. I blame my undergraduate training in
molecular biology for the cell metaphor, something I seem unable to escape.
See, e.g., Robert S. Chang, A Meditation on Borders, in IMMIGRANTs OUT!
THE NEW NATIVIsM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED
STATES 244, 246 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997); Robert S. Chang & Keith Aoki,
Centering the Immigrant in the Inter/National Imagination, 85 CAL. L. REV.
1395, 1411 (1997), 10 LARAZA L.J. 309, 325 (1998).
1. Lisa Ikemoto uses the phrase "'master narrative' to describe white su-
premacy's prescriptive, conflict-constructing power, which deploys exclusion-
ary concepts of race and privilege in ways that maintain intergroup conflict."
Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story ofAfrican Ameri-
can/Korean American Conflict: Hov We Constructed "Los Angeles," 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (1993).
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Los Angeles, like many cities, abides by these rules. The same can
be said of California and the United States. At each of these levels,
we can find evidence of this strategy of exclusion, containment, and
expulsion. My thesis is that Rampart was produced by the applica-
tion of these rules by Los Angeles, the state of California, and the
United States.2 In this sense, Rampart is not just a problem with the
LAPD or with our legal system generally. It is part of a larger sys-
tem and part of the city and nation's story about racialized minori-
ties.3 Things like Rampart happen when the rules of survival are ap-
plied against racialized groups who are coded as undesirable.
2. For the purposes of this Essay, I will focus on the United States and Los
Angeles, leaving for another discussion the history of California. For excellent
discussions centered on California, see ToMAs ALMAGUER, RACIAL FAULT
LINES: THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF WHITE SUPREMACY IN CALIFORNIA
(1994); ALEXANDER SAXTON, THE INDISPENSABLE ENEMY: LABOR AND THE
ANTI-CHINESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA (1971).
3. For much of the history of the United States, the rule of recognition for
the undesirable has depended largely upon those things that can be perceived
easily. Adrienne Davis notes that while the legal categories of race depended
upon ancestry or "blood," the practice of social differentiation relied largely on
what she terms scopic rules. See Adrienne D. Davis, Identity Notes One:
Playing in the Light, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 695, 705 (1996) ("I call this physical
component scopic in that it relies on the inspecting and scrutinizing gaze of a
(white) individual in order to discern and assign racial identity."). We might
understand these as visual and auditory rules of recognition. For the visual,
undesirable is coded as nonwhite. The auditory includes certain accents,
sometimes in combination with limited English proficiency. Cf Mari J. Ma-
tsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurispru-
dence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1333-49 (1991) (nar-
rating the experiences of a number of employees who were penalized for not
losing their "foreign" accents). If you register as undesirable, you will be sub-
ject to the rules.
I use the phrase "racialized groups" to emphasize that "race" is not an
essence or something discovered in nature but is instead the result of a process
by which racial categories are created and maintained. See Charles R. Law-
rence, III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus,
1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 443 n.52 (discussing the use by Kendall Thomas of the
term "race-ing" to describe the constructed-ness of race). For the social con-
struction of race, see generally MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL
FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990s (2d ed.
1994).
[34:843
SINGLE-CELLED ORGANISM
I will begin by discussing historical antecedents to Rampart. I
will then locate Rampart within a larger societal and temporal
framework.
I. THAT WAS THEN, TIs Is Now
On the first day of this Symposium, Johnnie Cochran reminded
us that the brutalization of minorities and minority communities is
neither limited to Los Angeles nor limited to the present.4 In addi-
tion to linking Rampart to the harsh treatment of racial minorities by
the New York Police Department, Cochran linked Rampart to the
earlier Zoot-Suit Riots that took place in Los Angeles in 1943.5 An
examination of these earlier events is instructive in understanding
police and mainstream societal attitudes toward minorities, especially
minority youths associated with gangs.
During these so-called riots, White, United States servicemen
and civilians went on a rampage beating, stripping, and shearing the
hair off young Latinos around the city.6 This rampage was appar-
ently a response to a group of servicemen being attacked by mem-
bers of a Mexican American "gang., 7 As the violence against Mexi-
can American youth escalated, Los Angeles police officers did little
to intervene. On the third night of mob violence directed against
4. See Johnnie Cochran, Remarks, Panel: Lawyers, Judges and the Com-
munity, Rampart Symposium (Sept 14, 2000).
5. See id. Zoot-suit is a reference to a style of clothing that became popu-
lar among various groups of American youth in the 1940s. See MAuRIcio
MAZON, THE ZOOT-SUIT RIOTS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SYMBOLIC
ANNIHILATION 6-7 (1984) (discussing possible origins of the zoot-suit style).
The use of"zoot-suit" and "Pachuco" to refer to Mexican Americans was actu-
ally a concession by newspapers to the war effort after Mexico declared war on
Germany, Italy, and Japan. Worried about international relations, the Office of
the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs "urged the newspapers in particular
to cease featuring the word 'Mexican' in stories of crime." CAREY
MCWILLAMS, NORTH FROM MExICO: THE SPANISH-SPEAKING PEOPLE OF THE
UNITED STATES 215 (new ed. 1990). Use of these code words did little to
ameliorate the anti-Mexican attitudes in newspaper coverage. See id.
6. See DAVID G. GUTIIgRREZ, VALLS AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN
AMERICANS, MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS, AND THE POLITICS OF ETHNICITY 124
(1995). Guti~rrez notes that "the events were widely publicized in the local and
national press as yet another example of Mexicans' inherent barbarity, hooli-
ganism, and questionable loyalty." Id.
7. See MCWILLAMS, supra note 5, at 220.
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Mexican Americans, the police adopted a policy of following the
mob "at a conveniently spaced interval,"8 which gave the servicemen
time to wreak their violence and move on to new victims. Instead of
arresting perpetrators, Los Angeles police officers mopped up after
them by arresting Mexican American victims on charges of disturb-
ing the peace; "[b]y morning, some forty-four Mexican boys, all se-
verely beaten, were under arrest." 9
This treatment of Mexican American youths was made possible
by racial attitudes or profiles held by Los Angeles police officers.' 0
These racial profiles became evident during the sensationalized
Sleepy Lagoon trial that took place in Los Angeles shortly before the
Zoot-Suit Riots." A group of twenty-four, comprising mostly young
Mexican American boys and men,' 2 were charged with the murder of
a young Mexican American, Jos6 Diaz.' 3  The defendants were
8. Id. at 222.
9. Id. at 223. Over the next couple days, spurred by newspaper accounts
warning of mass retaliations by Mexican zoot suiters, thousands of Anglo An-
gelenos took to the streets. Although most of the victims were Mexican
American, some Filipinos and Negroes were also attacked. See id. at 223 -24.
10. Although racial profiling by law enforcement has only recently gained
national attention, it is not a new phenomenon as the discussion infra shows.
11. Mauricio Maz6n goes further and states that "[u]ntil the advent of the
Sleepy Lagoon case Mexican-American youth had not been the focus of either
widespread police or journalistic investigation." MAz6N, supra note 5, at 20.
12. One of the group, Victor Rodman Thompson, is described as "an Anglo
youngster who, by long association with the Mexican boys in his neighbor-
hood, had become completely Mexicanized." MCWILLIAMS, supra note 5, at
208-09.
13. See People v. Zammora et al, 66 Cal. App. 2d 166, 152 P.2d 180
(1944). Seventeen were convicted. The entire group was charged with murder
in the first degree because the "alleged felony had been committed during [a]
'conspiracy."' MAzON, supra note 5, at 21. As explained by George Shibley,
the attorney for several of the defendants,
The conspiracy was a conspiracy or an agreement to commit a tres-
pass. In other words, when these twenty-two or forty-two young men
and women said, "let's go crash the party," or "let's go to the Wil-
liams ranch," whether they said it in words or by assent in just joining
the group, they were agreeing or conspiring to commit a misdemeanor.
Id.
The trial is dramatized in the film Zoot Suit directed by Luis Valdez.
See ZOOT SUIT (Universal Pictures 1981). Except for the cars, the clothes, and
the hairstyles, you might think you were watching a dramatization of the go-
ings on at Rampart. The actions of the police, the prosecution, and the judge
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described throughout the trial by the prosecution as members of the
38th Street Gang.' 4 Seventeen were convicted, twelve for having
conspired to murder Diaz, five for assault."5 Of the seventeen, fif-
teen were born in the United States, two in Mexico.' 6 The proceed-
ings were highly irregular: with the exception of two defendants
who were able to get a separate trial, the rest of the defendants were
tried together; they were not permitted to sit with their attorneys and
could confer with them only during breaks; they were not permitted
to get haircuts during the months before trial; and upon orders of the
prosecutor, clean clothing meant for the defendants was intercepted
by the jail staff.'
7
The irregularities began, though, before the trial. The grand jury
that was convened to decide if charges should be brought heard a re-
port prepared by Lieutenant Edward Ayers that set forth a "number
of factors contributing to the great proportion of crime by a certain
element of the Mexican population."' s The report begins innocently
enough, citing a number of economic rationales, including discrimi-
nation in employment and job training.' 9 The report also referred to
segregation in public schools and public accommodations, all of
which "causes resentment among the Mexican people. ' ,20 But after
these early nods to societal discrimination directed against Mexican
Americans, the report sets forth biology as the main basis for under-
standing Mexican criminality:
Although a wild cat and a domestic cat are of the same
seem eerily similar to some of the things described at the Symposium by the
Deputy Public Defender Tamar Toister. See Tamar Toister, Remarks, Panel:
Lawyers, Judges and the Community, Rampart Symposium (Sept. 14, 2000);
see also Tamar Toister, Commentar : Rampart Hasn't Changed How Criminal
Courts Do Business, L.A. TMIES, Sept. 21, 2000, at B1 1.
14. See Eduardo Obreg6n Pagan, Sleepy Lagoon: The Politics of Youth and
Race in Wartime Los Angeles, 1940-45, at 158-59 (1996) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Michigan, 1996) (on file with the author).
15. See CmIzENs' COMM. FOR THE DEF. OF MEXICAN AMERICAN YOUTH,
THE SLEEPY LAGOON CASE 7 (1942).
16. See id.
17. See McWILUAMs, supra note 5, at 209.
18. Foreign Relations Bureau of the Los Angeles Sheriff s Office, Statis-
tics, reprinted in Solomon J. Jones, The Government Riots of Los Angeles,
June 1943, at 85 (1969) (unpublished thesis, UCLA) (on file vith the author).
19. See id.
20. Id.
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family they have certain biological characteristics so differ-
ent that while one may be domesticated the other would
have to be caged to be kept in captivity; and there is practi-
cally as much difference between the races of man as so
aptly put by Rudyard Kipling when he said when writing of
the Oriental, "East is east and west is west and never the
twain shall meet," which gives us an insight into the present
problem because the Indian is... Oriental in background-
at least he shows many of the Oriental characteristics, espe-
cially in his utter disregard for the value of life.
2'
Ayres reinforces his point about Oriental/Indian barbarity by dis-
cussing Aztecs and human sacrifice. Ayres goes on to state that "the
Mexican Indian is mostly Indian-and that is the element which mi-
grated to the United States in such large numbers. 22 The genetic
heritage is something that Mexican immigrants cannot escape and
which becomes apparent in styles of fighting:
The Caucasion [sic], especially the Anglo-Saxon, when en-
gaged in fighting, particularly among youths, resort to fisti-
cuff and may at times kick each other, which is considered
unsportive, but this Mexican element considers all that to be
a sign of weakness, and all he knows and feels is a desire to
use a knife or some lethal weapon. In other words, his de-
sire is to kill, or at least to let blood. That is why it is diffi-
cult for the Anglo-Saxon to understand the psychology of
the Indian ....23
Drastic measures are necessary to deal with this problem element: in
the name of controlling and preventing gangsterism by this biologi-
cally-inclined population, Ayres suggested harsh sentences for vio-
lators, curfew regulations, and legalized fingerprinting for "everyone
taken into custody whether for prosecution or merely for investiga-
tion.",24 Many of these views were shared by Captain Vernon Ras-
mussen of the LAPD Homicide-Subversive Bureau, who testified to
the Grand Jury "that too many Mexican-American youth were being
21. Id. at 85-86.
22. Id. at 86.
23. Id. at 87.
24. Id.
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released on parole rather than doing hard time.... [O]nly swift and
harsh punishment for 'the Mexican element' would deter youth from
developing attitudes 'exactly contrary to [those] adopted by the re-
spectable Caucasian element."'
25
These attitudes expressed by these LAPD officers appear to
have been put into practice:
Law enforcement officials assembled files on suspected
gang members, coordinated men and materiel [sic] and
combed the east side of Los Angeles where mostly work-
ing-class people of color lived. The police and sheriffs
proudly netted hundreds of arrests during the summer of
1942.... Hundreds of young men and women from central
and eastern Los Angeles were rounded up during this pe-
riod, fingerprinted, and booked not for crimes committed
but for criminality suspected.-
The Sleepy Lagoon trial and the Zoot-Suit Riots are reflective of
the effects of racial profiling that is made all the worse when it is
done with the sanction of law. The earlier demonization of Latino
youths, the racial profiles based on their genetic and cultural heri-
tage, animate today's racial profiles. We can see echoes of this in
Linda Beres and Tom Griffith's discussion of a gang expert who
wrote and testified about super criminal youths who engaged in im-
pulsive violence, had vacant stares with remorseless eyes, and were
morally impoverished.27 This history helps us to understand how
Rampart was constructed.
When you locate Rampart within a larger temporal and geo-
graphic framework, you begin to understand that Rampart did not
just happen. The history of Los Angeles, the state of California, and
the United States made Rampart possible.
25. Pagdn, supra note 14, at 146 (quoting Letter from Vernon Rasmussen,
to Ernest W. Oliver, 1942 Los Angeles County Grand Jury Foreman (Aug. 12,
1942) (on file at Ron L6pez Papers, Sleepy Lagoon Material Collection, Chi-
cano Studies Resource Library Special Collections, University of California,
Los Angeles)).
26. Id. at 142-43.
27. See Linda Beres & Tom Griffith, Remarks, Panel: Lawyers, Judges, and
the Community, Rampart Symposium (Sept. 14, 2000).
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II. THE UNITED STATES AS A SINGLE-CELLED ORGANISM
The United States, with regard to racialized minorities who were
coded as undesirable, has pursued a policy of exclusion, isolation and
control, and expulsion when possible. The treatment of Blacks pro-
vides ample support for this proposition.
In its early history, the United States permitted Blacks to be
brought into the country because it was to the advantage of those
with power.2' Entry of Blacks was allowed, but Blacks were isolated
and controlled by the legal regime surrounding slavery.29 But this
presence of Blacks was considered by many of this nation's Found-
ing Fathers to be detrimental to the future of this nation. For exam-
ple, Thomas Jefferson who expressed the belief that if slavery were
abolished, rather than permit the freed slaves to remain, they must be
deported with their labor replaced by that of imported free White
settlers.30 Then you have President Abraham Lincoln who met with
a deputation of colored men in 1862 and told them that a sum of
money had been appropriated by Congress, and placed at his dispo-
sition for the purpose of aiding the colonization in some country of
the people, or a portion of them, of African descent. 31 Lincoln
blamed the war on the presence of Blacks: "But for your race among
us there could not be war, although many men engaged on either side
do not care for you one way or the other.... It is better for us both,
therefore, to be separated., 32 He then proposed a colony in Central
America, saying that "The country is a very excellent one for any
people, and with great natural resources and advantages, and espe-
cially because of the similarity of climate with your native land-
28. See generally JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 (1966).
29. For the development of the institution of slavery in the British colonies,
see A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE & THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978).
30. See Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia (1781-82), in
CLASSICAL BLACK NATIONALISM: FROM THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO
MARcus GARVEY 45 (Wilson Jeremiah Moses ed., 1996).
31. See ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Address on Colonization to a Deputation of
Colored Men (1862), in CLASSICAL BLACK NATIONALISM, supra note 30, at
209.
32. Id. at 211.
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thus being suited to your physical condition., 33 Another example of
rule 3: Expel when possible that which is undesirable.
It turned out that expulsion of Blacks to Central America or to
the African colony Liberia was not feasible. So what then? If you
have already let them in and cannot resort to rule 3, you are left with
rule 2-isolate and control that which is undesirable. You create a
legal and social regime where Blacks are segregated with regard to
residence,34 education,35 employment,36 and intimate relations.3 7
But as racial minorities began to gain or press for civil rights,
new control mechanisms arose. When residential or educational in-
tegration threatened rule 2, other mechanisms developed to isolate
and control. The production of inner city ghettos populated largely
by racial minorities, and suburbs populated largely by Whites was no
accident. White flight out of cities required local, state, and federal
governments to invest massively in infrastructure in the form of
highways, sewers, and other utilities to serve the newly forming sub-
urbs. This has been described by George Lipsitz as the active in-
vestment in whiteness.
38
But in order for this investment in whiteness to keep paying
dividends long into the future, neighborhoods and schools must re-
main segregated. With Proposition 209 and the actions of the Uni-
versity of California Board of Regents, we are seeing the resegrega-
tion of our top public institutions of higher education. This fits into
the story that I am developing.
The segregation in our local public schools and the residential
segregation in Rampart is part of this story. The ethnic breakdown
of the Rampart district is as follows:
33. Id. at212.
34. Cf Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (outlawing court enforce-
ment of racially restrictive covenants).
35. Cf Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (outlawing
dejure segregation on the basis of race in public education).
36. Cf Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 1971 (creating a limited cause
of action against private employers who discriminate on the basis of race and
other forbidden characteristics).
37. Cf Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (outlaving statutory scheme
preventing marriages between persons solely on racial classification basis).
38. See GEORGE LipsiTz, THE PossEssivE INvESTMENT IN WHITENESS:
How WHrrE PEOPLE PROFIT FROM IDENTITY POLITICS (1998).
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TABLE 1: ETHNIC COMPOSmON OF RAMPART AND Los ANGELES
39
Rampart City of Los Angeles
Latino 79% 48%
Asian 15% 10%
Black 4% 12%
White 3 % 30%
American less than 1% less than 1%
Indian
Rampart is just part of the story of a highly segregated Los An-
geles. Segregated neighborhoods lead to segregated schools. You
can see this if you visit our local public schools. They are right
around the comer. Drive by their playgrounds and look at the kids.
These segregated schools with limited resources lead to lessened
educational opportunities. Lessened educational opportunities lead
to lessened employment opportunities. Limited employment oppor-
tunities maintain the concentrated poverty in the segregated neigh-
borhoods. Concentrated poverty, substandard overcrowded housing,
and educational and employment disadvantage create the conditions
for crime and social disorder.4 ° Crime and social disorder invites the
military style occupation described in this Symposium by Robert
Benson.
41
Watts in 1965,42 the civil unrest in 1992,'4 and Rampart are
merely symptoms of the explosions that can take place when dreams
are deferred. Fixing the Rampart police scandal will require fixing
the conditions that made Rampart possible.
39. See The Rampart Scandal: Genesis of a Scandal, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25,
2000, at Al8.
40. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 137-40
(1993).
41. See Robert W. Benson, Remarks, Changing Police Culture: The Sine
Qua Non of Reform, Rampart Symposium (Sept 14, 2000).
42. See, e.g., GERALD HORNE, FIRE THIS TIME: THE WATrS UPRISING AND
THE 1960s (1995).
43. See, e.g., Los ANGELES-STRUGGLES TOWARD MULTIETHNIC
COMMUNITY: ASIAN AMERICAN, AFRICAN AMERICAN, AND LATINO
PERSPECTIVES (Edward T. Chang & Russell C. Leong eds., 1993).
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Neighborhood segregation, what I'm calling a strategy of con-
tainment, did not arise by accident. It was the product of both ne-
glect and purposeful discrimination. It requires redress.
My account of the development of residential segregation is
largely a story of Black and White. I apologize for my Black/White
focus but I will relate it to L.A. and the largely Latino population of
Rampart.
At the turn of the century, the level of residential segregation
was significantly lower than it is now.44 Perhaps surprisingly, this
century has seen an intensification of residential segregation along
racial lines. At the turn of this century, Whites and Blacks encoun-
tered each other on a casual basis more frequently than today.45 It is
arguable that new methods for achieving residential segregation
arose as a response to demands for equality by Blacks and other ra-
cial minorities. Residential segregation might have contained within
it a cultural meaning where White people could gain a psychological
wage from the feeling of racial superiority that separation engen-
dered. It is arguable that poor Whites put up with class oppression in
part because of the social status they had over the truly disadvan-
taged.46
When zoning by local authorities was upheld by the Supreme
Court, a number of local authorities used zoning ordinances that
were explicitly racial, the effect of which was to exclude certain ra-
cial minorities from living in certain areas.47 In 1917, these explicit
racial zoning ordinances were deemed unconstitutional. 48 New
methods were required. Extralegal means were used: mob violence
was directed against White homeowners who contemplated selling
their homes to persons of color, or against the persons of color if and
when they moved into a White neighborhood. 49 There are numerous
documented instances of this throughout this century, some of recent
vintage. The primary legal method was the use of racially restrictive
44. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 40, at 17.
45. See id. at 17-18.
46. See W.E.B. Du BoIs, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION (1935); DAVID
ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1991).
47. See Lipsrrz, supra note 38, at 25.
48. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 40, at 41-42.
49. See id. at 34-35.
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covenants to create and maintain residential segregation. 0 Use of
racially restrictive covenants became widespread, and they were en-
forceable in a court of law until Shelley v. Kraemer5' in 1948. This
case, like Brown in the context of school desegregation,52 provided a
very limited remedy. Shelley v. Kraemer did not outlaw the use of
racially restrictive covenants; nor did it forbid private discrimination
in home sales; all it prevented was the participation of courts in en-
forcing the covenants.
The government actively participated in encouraging and often
requiring the use of racially restrictive covenants for FHA and VA
loan insurance programs through 1950.53 The FHA's Underwriting
Manual "openly stated that 'if a neighborhood is to retain stability, it
is necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied by the same
social and racial classes' and further recommended that 'subdivision
regulations and suitable restrictive covenants' are the best way to en-
sure such neighborhood stability.",54 For two years following Shelley
v. Kraemer, these governmental agencies actively defied the Su-
preme Court's mandate. If you put this together with the Federal
Home Owners' Loan Corporation's explicit use of race in marking
neighborhoods as creditworthy or not,56 it is difficult to say that the
government did not actively prevent racial minorities from getting
loans while simultaneously aiding White borrowers. The maps cre-
ated by the HOLC, "Residential Security Maps," were widely used
by private banks in deciding whether or not to make loans.57 The re-
sult-disinvestment in Black areas; investment in White areas.
50. See id. at 36.
51. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
52. For a discussion of some of the limits of the Brown ruling, see Derrick
A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
53. See LIPSITz, supra note 38, at 26.
54. MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE
WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL EQUALITY 18 (1995).
55. See id.
56. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 40, at 51-54 (detailing the practices
of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, a government-sponsored program,
which rated neighborhoods as creditworthy or not, with Black neighborhoods
redlined as the least creditworthy).
57. See id. at 52.
[34:843
SINGLE-CELLED ORGANISM
The effect was dramatic. Between 1934 and 1962, the FH-A and
VA programs made possible the purchase of $120 billion of real es-
tate, with less than two percent going to nonwhite families. 58 Be-
tween 1934 and 1969 the percentage of families living in owner-
occupied dwellings increased from 44% to 63%. 59 These programs
were quite effective in aiding upward class mobility, creating a sig-
nificantly larger middle class that was largely White. These pro-
grams affected the racial composition of neighborhoods.
The effects of this explicit racial discrimination are still with us
today. In 1993, "86% of suburban whites lived in places with a
Black population below 1%."'60 Of course, evidence of residential
segregation, by itself, does not indicate that racial discrimination
continues to occur in the housing market. Further, the data over the
past three decades have shown increasing agreement among Whites
with the principle that Blacks should be allowed to live wherever
they want.6' However, the polling data also reveals that most Whites
feel comfortable living in neighborhoods where the percentage of
Black families is very low.62 In other words, the polling data indi-
cates the following sentiment among Whites: "Blacks should be free
to live wherever they want. I wouldn't want to live in a neighbor-
hood that had more than a few Black families."
This sentiment is given force by mechanisms whereby Blacks
receive less favorable treatment from real estate brokers and from
lending institutions. In 1977, Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) conducted a study in forty metro areas in which they sent
auditors, Black and White, to seek housing. They found that Whites
received more favorable treatment than Blacks in close to half the
transactions:
58. See Lipsrrz, supra note 38, at 6.
59. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 40, at 53.
60. LiPsrrz, supra note 38, at 7.
61. See HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA:
TRENDS AND INTERPRETATIONS 150-53 (rev. ed. 1997).
62. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 40, at 88-93.
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TABLE 2: PERCENTAGE OF TRANSACTIONS IN WHICH WHITES
RECEIVE MORE FAVORABLE TREATMENT THAN BLACKS.
63
Northern Metro Southern Metro
Areas Areas
Rental 52 45
Sales 54 41
White favoritism is defined to occur when white auditor receives fa-
vorable treatment on at least one of the following items and Black
auditors receive favorable treatment on none: housing availability,
courtesy to client, terms and conditions of sale or rental, information
requested of client, information supplied to client.
In 1988, HUD repeated the study in twenty metro areas.64 They used
the following methodology:
Real estate ads in major metropolitan newspapers were ran-
domly sampled and realtors were approached by auditors
who inquired about the availability of the advertised unit;
they also asked about other units that might be on the mar-
ket. The Housing Discrimination Study (HDS) covered
both the rental and sales markets, and the auditors were
given incomes and family characteristics appropriate to the
housing unit advertised.
The typical advertised unit was located in a White, middle
to upper class area, as were most of the real estate offices;
few homes were in Black or racially mixed neighbor-
hoods.65
HUD noticed that real estate brokers generally didn't advertise
homes in Black or racially mixed neighborhoods, or if they did, they
just gave them one line descriptions. As a result, "[r]eal estate com-
panies.., do a poor job advertising and marketing homes in racially
63. See id. at 101 (citation omitted).
64. See id. at 102.
65. Id.
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mixed neighborhoods, thereby restricting white demand for inte-
grated housing and promoting segregation. 66
The 1988 study found "little evidence that discrimination
against Blacks has declined since the first nationwide assessment in
1977. "67 It also found that perhaps the level of discrimination was
understated in the 1977 study. The 1988 study revealed that
"[housing was systematically made more available to whites in 45%
of the transactions in the rental market and in 34% of those in the
sales market. Whites also received more favorable credit assistance
in 46% of sales encounters, and were offered more favorable terms in
17% of rental transactions. ' 68 There was a high probability that an
additional unit was presented to White but not to Black auditors. As
a result, between 60-90% of the housing units made available to
Whites were not brought to the attention of Blacks.69
The strategy of isolation and containment in the form of resi-
dential segregation coupled with other barriers to home ownership
has had a tremendous impact on the average wealth of Black and
White families. Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro note that:
Skewed access to mortgage and housing markets and the
racial valuing of neighborhoods on the basis of segregated
markets result in enormous racial wealth disparity. Banks
turn down qualified blacks much more often for home loans
than they do similarly qualified whites. Blacks who do
qualify, moreover, pay higher interest rates on home mort-
gages than whites.70
Add to this property appreciation and intergenerational wealth trans-
fers, and perhaps we can begin to understand why the average wealth
of a White household in 1993 was over $45,740 while the average
wealth of a Black household was $4418, and for a Hispanic family,
$4656 (with Asian Americans not mentioned).7'
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 104.
70. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 54.
71. See U.S. Census Bureau, Asset Ownership of Households: 1993 tbl. F,
at http://www.census.gov/hheswvvealthvlth93f.htnl (last visited Oct. 24,
2000).
Wealth is a better indicator of racial inequality than income. See
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Residential segregation eviscerated the hope that Brown would
result in integration which was supposed to ensure equal educational
opportunities and to lessen the prejudice in the hearts and minds of
children who were our future. With the fight over bussing, and the
Supreme Court's ruling against interdistrict remedies, 72 Whites who
had successfully fled to new school districts in the suburbs were then
not subject to desegregation orders. The result-inner city schools
that were largely minority, suburban schools that were largely
White-was deemed to be a situation beyond the scope of legal re-
dress as accepted by the Court.
73
Control and containment were perhaps the primary mechanisms
for controlling Blacks. The same can probably be said for Native
Americans. Consider the reservation system. Isolate that which is
undesirable. With Latinas and Latinos and persons of Asian ances-
try, Rules 1 and 3 have played a greater role.
OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 54, at 2. They note that "even when Blacks
and Whites display similar characteristics-for example, are on a par educa-
tionally and occupationally-a potent difference of $43,143 in home equity
and financial assets still remains. Likewise, giving the average black house-
hold the same attributes as the average White household leaves a $25,794 ra-
cial gap in financial assets alone." Id. at 8.
72. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). This principle was af-
firmed in Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995). For an excellent discussion
of Missouri v. Jenkins, see Robert Hayman & Nancy Levit, The Tales of White
Folk: Doctrine, Narrative, and the Reconstruction of Racial Reality, 84 CAL.
L. REV. 377 (1996) (reviewing RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO
CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AMERICA AND RACE (1995)).
73. See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 718. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart
noted:
It is this essential fact of a predominantly Negro school population in
Detroit-caused by unknown and perhaps unknowable factors such as
in-migration, birth rates, economic changes, or cumulative acts of pri-
vate racial fears-that accounts for the "growing core of Negro
schools," a "core" that has grown to include virtually the entire city.
The Constitution simply does not allow federal courts to attempt to
change that situation unless and until it is shown that the State, or its
political subdivisions, have contributed to cause the situation to exist.
No record has been made in this case showing that the racial composi-
tion of the Detroit school population or that residential patterns within
Detroit and in the surrounding areas were in any significant measure
caused by governmental activity.
Id. at 756 n.2.
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As a general rule, keep them out.74 But sometimes, we want
their labor. When we need low wage laborers, we invite them in. In
1917, the first foreign labor program was initiated." Agricultural
employers in the Southwest brought in workers from Mexico. Then
along came the Great Depression. Latinos lost their low-wage jobs
as the jobs disappeared or were taken by Whites now willing to do
the work they had refused to do before.76 Loss of jobs, violence, de-
nial of welfare benefits, and other tactics led to voluntary departures
and mass deportations achieved through deception and coercion."
Then World War II came along and we needed their labor again.
The Bracero Program was instituted to bring Mexican workers into
the United States.78 The United States looked the other way when
they overstayed their labor contracts and when undocumented per-
sons filled the fields.79 Their labor put cheap food on people's ta-
bles. Few complained.80  When these workers were no longer
needed, the Commissioner of Immigration developed Operation
Wetback:8 '
Between 1954 and 1959, Operation Wetback was responsi-
ble for over 3.7 million Latinos being deported. Of that
number, an unknown amount were American citizens. In
74. The various measures directed against persons of Asian ancestry.
75. See GILBERT P. CARRASCO, Latinos in the United States: Invitation and
Exile, in IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATMsM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT
IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 190, 193 (Juan Perea ed., 1997).
76. See id. at 202 n.19 ("As a result of the Midwest Dust Bowl, more than
350,000 Anglos found themselves unemployed and willing to work for the low
wages usually earned by Latinos.").
77. See id. at 194.
78. See KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM,
IMMIGRATION, AND THE I.N.S. 1-2 (1992).
79. At one point, official policy of legalization "gave priority to illegal im-
migrants found in the United States. By 1950, the number of Mexicans 'le-
galized' and 'paroled' to growers as braceros was five times higher than the
number actually recruited from Mexico." Id. at 2.
80. A number of Mexican American groups opposed the Bracero Program
because they believed that large-scale immigration from Mexico interfered
with the progress of Mexican Americans to assimilate or integrate into main-
streamUnited States society. See GuritRREZ, supra note 6, at 135-38.
81. See CARRA.SCO, supra note 75, at 197.
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their haste to deport "illegals," only 63,500 persons were
removed through formal deportation proceedings.
Rule 3: Expel, whenever possible, that which is undesirable.
This is part of the history that sets the stage for Los Angeles,
which also abides by the 3 rules. Los Angeles is highly segregated.
This is not the product of random chance. Isolate the undesirable.
Expel when possible. Expulsion can come in the form of sending the
undesirable to prison. Or deporting them. The police have played a
crucial role in enforcing the 3 rules.
Before 1979, the LAPD "routinely detain[ed] suspected illegal
immigrants without bringing criminal charges, and transport[ed]
them to the INS for arrest based on suspicion of noncriminal viola-
tions of federal immigration laws."82 Reforms took place in 1979,
brought about by a lawsuit.83 The powers that be acknowledged that
the earlier policy resulted in immigrant communities distrusting the
police; members of immigrant communities, regardless of legal
status, were reluctant to seek police help because of fear of the po-
lice. The changes took the form of an internal policy called Special
Order 40. The police were not to initiate a "police action with the
objective of discovering a person's immigration status. 84 Officers
were not to arrest anyone for violation of the U.S. immigration code.
Under certain circumstances, if an undocumented person were ar-
rested for certain levels of crimes, the officer could refer that person
to the INS but must abide by certain procedures.85 This was a step in
the right direction. But the policy cannot be effective if the police do
not abide by it.
The Rampart scandal has revealed that the CRASH Unit some-
times worked in collusion with the INS.86 In cases where there was
insufficient evidence to prosecute alleged gang members, some of
the cases were turned over to the INS if the alleged gang members
82. Tina Daunt, Council Seeks to Limit INS Presence at LAPD Stations,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2000, at B1.
83. See id.
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. See Anne-Marie O'Connor, INS Memo Calls Gang Allegations False,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2000, at Al.
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were undocumented.8 7 If an undocumented person witnessed im-
proper behavior by officers or complained about an officer, certain
CRASH officers would refer them to INS agents.88 If you can't put
them in prison, if possible, expel them. It appears that INS agents
used to hang out at certain LAPD stations at the invitation of the po-
lice.89
What message do you think that sends to undocumented persons
who may be crime victims? The police are charged with protecting
and serving the public. Undocumented persons are then excluded
from the public, excluded from the full protection of the police. It
creates a vulnerable victim pool
The border is not limited to the geographic periphery. Anybody
who has gone through the INS checkpoint between San Diego and
Los Angeles know this. Who receives fturther scrutiny at this check-
point? At the airport? At the workplace when the INS does its
raids? And if Proposition 187 had been upheld, at hospitals and
schools. The border is not limited to the geographic periphery. The
border is inscribed upon the bodies and faces of Blacks, Browns,
Yellows, and Reds who seem unable to shed the aura or taint of un-
Americanness, undesirability, regardless of how good their English
is, no matter how many generations their family may have been here.
The Rampart police scandal is a problem. But it's part of the
larger problem created by rules I set forth before. Exclude. Contain.
Expel. If we don't address the creation and maintenance of segre-
gated neighborhoods, which create the conditions for crime and so-
cial disorder, which then are used to justify the military-style occu-
pation of these neighborhoods, then Rampart, which has happened
before, will simply repeat itself. The names may be different. The
minority group may be different. But it will be the same old story.
Father Boyle said yesterday that Rampart is just a symptom.90
He told us that reform depends on the underlying analysis. If you
don't want Rampart to happen again, I urge you to work to undo the
87. See Anne-Marie O'Connor, INS Agents Suggested Rampart Deporta-
tions, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 3, 2000, at Al.
88. See Anne-Marie O'Connor, Rampart Set Up Latinos to Be Deported,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24,2000, at Al.
89. See Daunt, supra note 82, at Bl.
90. Father Boyle, Remarks, Rampart Symposium (Sept. 14, 2000).
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rules of survival that got us here. Modeling ourselves after a single-
cell organism is both stupid and unjust. It's time for Los Angeles,
the state of California, and the United States to evolve.
